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This paper evaluates the welfare bene￿ts of introducing environmental regulation in a market
that is subject to the threat of entry. We consider complete and incomplete information settings,
where potential entrants use the regulator￿ s tax policy and the incumbent￿ s output decisions in
order to infer the incumbent￿ s cost structure. When the regulator is absent, we show that ￿rms￿
entry-deterring practices increase pollution relative to complete information. Hence, under
certain conditions, environmental regulation becomes more bene￿cial in incomplete than in
complete information contexts. Our results, therefore, identify under which cases an under-
or over-estimation of the welfare bene￿ts of environmental regulation arises from ignoring the
information setting in which ￿rms interact. We also examine how this estimation error increases
as ￿rms become more symmetric in their production costs.
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11 Introduction
The role of the United States￿Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has recently been under the
scrutiny of both politicians and lobbyists. Coinciding with its 40th anniversary, several politicians
became especially vocal in their criticisms of the agency on the basis that its regulations hinder ￿rms￿
competitiveness by reducing their ability to adjust their production facilities, thereby negatively
a⁄ecting ￿rms￿capacity to create jobs and promote economic growth.1
Our paper contributes to this debate by evaluating the welfare bene￿ts from environmental
regulation, measured as the di⁄erence between social welfare when the regulator is present and
absent, and then comparing these welfare bene￿ts in di⁄erent information contexts. Speci￿cally, we
show that ignoring the information setting in which the industry operates can lead to a systematic
under- or over-estimation of the welfare-improving e⁄ects of regulation. This result implies that,
under certain conditions, the task of the regulatory agency yields large welfare bene￿ts when ￿rms
interact in incomplete information frameworks, making environmental policy especially necessary
in these settings.
We consider an entry-deterrence model where a monopolist has operated for a long period of
time. Because production generates a negative externality, this incumbent has been subject to
environmental regulation for an extended period, allowing the regulator to accumulate relatively
accurate information about the incumbent￿ s costs. This setting describes, for instance, power
generating companies that use fossil fuels as their primary input, since they are regarded as regional
monopolies in several states across the U.S.2 and, in addition, have faced environmental regulations
from the EPA since the agency￿ s inception in 1970.3 Unlike the regulator, potential entrants have
access to less precise information about the incumbent￿ s costs. As a consequence, the entrant bases
its entry decision upon the information it infers after observing two signals: the emission fee that
the regulator imposes on the incumbent and the ￿rm￿ s output decision.
We investigate the welfare bene￿ts of environmental regulation under two information settings:
complete and incomplete information. As a benchmark for comparison, we ￿rst analyze a complete
information context, where all agents are perfectly informed about the incumbent￿ s cost structure.
Our results show that an ine¢ ciency arises when the regulator is absent, given that ￿rms do not
internalize the negative e⁄ects of their pollution on social welfare. The presence of the regula-
1Some House Republicans have been especially critical in their statements. For instance, the Chairman of the
House Interior and Environment Appropriations Subcommittee, mentioned on July 12, 2011, that ￿the scariest
agency in the federal government is the EPA... an agency that has lost its bearings.￿Similarly, the Chairman of the
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, expressed his concerns that the ￿EPA￿ s ￿ regulatory jihad￿is strangling
any chance of economic recovery.￿ Several Democrats have also criticized the EPA. For example, in March 2011,
representatives from Minnesota, West Virginia, and Oklahoma joined a bill supported by 43 Senate Republicans that
would bar the EPA from using federal law to control greenhouse gases from re￿neries and other industrial facilities;
Capiello (2011). Finally, Mufson (2008) reports that lobbyists such as AmericasPower.org have launched a $30 million
advertising campaign against the EPA￿ s regulation of CO2 emissions.
2According to Slocum (2007), for instance, 92% of U.S. households have no ability to choose an alternative
electricity supplier, since the wholesale market of power generation is essentially monopolized.
3Coal-￿red power plants, for instance, are generally considered regional monopolies that have continually faced
environmental regulations. For example, the Clean Air Act of 1963 and its subsequent amendments in 1970 and 1990
aimed at reducing NOx emissions, as well as the more drastic policy issued by the EPA in September 1998.
2tor hence becomes welfare improving, since environmental regulation induces the socially optimal
output; a result that is consistent with the existing literature.
We then examine an incomplete information setting, where the potential entrant does not
observe the incumbent￿ s costs, but assigns a prior probability to these costs being either high or
low. When the probability of facing a high-cost incumbent is su¢ ciently large, an ￿informative￿
equilibrium can be supported, in which information about the incumbent￿ s costs is conveyed to the
entrant. Without regulation, this equilibrium prescribes that the low-cost incumbent overproduces,
relative to complete information, in order to reveal its e¢ cient cost structure to the potential
entrant, thus deterring entry. Such overproduction, however, generates more pollution, suggesting
that an additional form of ine¢ ciency emerges, stemming from the incomplete information setting
in which ￿rms operate. As a result, the introduction of environmental regulation entails larger
welfare bene￿ts under incomplete than under complete information. We furthermore show that the
welfare bene￿ts of regulation increase when the cost di⁄erential between incumbent and entrant is
small. In this case, the low-cost incumbent faces the threat of a ￿tough￿competitor and, hence,
is willing to substantially overproduce in order to signal its type to the potential entrant, thus
deterring entry. Such overproduction, however, entails an increase in pollution, thereby making the
regulatory agency￿ s task more bene￿cial.
Our ￿ndings suggest implications for the assessment of the welfare bene￿ts of environmental
regulation. Speci￿cally, if ￿rms are relatively symmetric in their cost structure, a regulator who
assumes that the industry operates under complete information ￿ while, in fact, potential entrants
do not observe the incumbent￿ s costs￿ would underestimate the welfare bene￿ts of regulation.
By contrast, when ￿rms are asymmetric in their costs, our results imply that the regulator can
essentially ignore the information context in which the industry operates, given that the welfare
bene￿ts from intervention are similar in both information settings.
In the context of low priors, we demonstrate that, when the regulatory agency is absent, an
￿uninformative￿equilibrium can be sustained where the high-cost incumbent mimics the output
decision of the low-cost ￿rm, i.e., the high-cost incumbent overproduces relative to complete in-
formation. Such a mimicking strategy conceals information from the potential entrant, who is
deterred from the industry. Importantly, the introduction of incomplete information, therefore,
gives rise to both positive and negative welfare e⁄ects. On one hand, the incumbent￿ s ￿rst-period
overproduction increases pollution but, on the other hand, deterrence of the potential entrant re-
duces second-period pollution relative to the complete information game, where entry ensues and
aggregate pollution increases. When ￿rst-period overproduction is large ￿ which occurs when the
cost di⁄erential between high- and low-type incumbent is strong￿ the negative e⁄ect dominates,
and social welfare under incomplete information is smaller than under the complete information
setting. Otherwise, social welfare under incomplete information environments is larger. These ￿nd-
ings suggest policy implications for contexts where the EPA is absent, e.g., it does not set emission
fees. In particular, the regulatory agency can still improve social welfare by strategically revealing
information about the incumbent￿ s cost structure to potential entrants when the cost di⁄erential
3among ￿rms is large, or by concealing such information otherwise.
When the regulator is present, our paper shows that the uninformative equilibrium can only be
supported under more restrictive conditions. Therefore, the presence of environmental regulation
hinders the incumbent￿ s ability to conceal its type and deter entry, thus entailing a welfare bene￿t
relative to settings where the regulator is absent. Furthermore, such welfare bene￿t becomes larger
as the overproduction of the unregulated high-cost incumbent increases, i.e., when ￿rms are cost-
asymmetric.
Summarizing, when ￿rms are relatively symmetric in their cost structure and priors are low,
a regulator who ignores the incomplete information setting where the industry operates would
overestimate the welfare bene￿ts of regulation, a result that di⁄ers from that when priors are high.
Intuitively, when the regulator is absent and priors are high, an informative equilibrium emerges in
which overproduction (and its associated pollution) increases when ￿rms become more symmetric,
since the incumbent seeks to deter the entry of a tough competitor. By contrast, when priors are
low, an uninformative equilibrium arises where overproduction (and pollution) shrinks as ￿rms are
relatively symmetric, given that the incumbent reduces its mimicking e⁄orts.
From a policy perspective, our results suggest that, if environmental regulation is accompanied
by policies that reduce the production costs of polluting ￿rms, the welfare bene￿ts from regulation in
the incomplete and complete information setting are very similar when priors are high. In this case,
our measurement of the welfare bene￿ts of regulation can hence overlook the information context
in which ￿rms interact without making large estimation errors. When priors are low, however, the
combination of environmental regulation and cost-reducing policies shrinks the welfare bene￿ts of
regulation in the incomplete information game, pushing these bene￿ts below those in the complete
information setting. Therefore, ignoring the information context where the industry operates can,
in this case, lead to an overestimation of the welfare bene￿ts of the EPA￿ s role. Our ￿ndings
also suggest that environmental protection agencies can manage the distribution of information
to potential entrants in order to improve social welfare. This case describes settings where the
imposition of emission fees is politically unpopular and, hence, environmental policy is con￿ned
to the strategic dissemination of information. In particular, when priors are high, we demonstrate
that the distribution of information is welfare-improving. When priors are low, however, the EPA
might strategically conceal information from potential entrants in order to increase social welfare,
especially when ￿rms are relatively symmetric in their cost structure.
Related literature. This paper relates to the literature of environmental policy under uncer-
tainty. Speci￿cally, Weitzman (1974),4 Roberts and Spence (1976), Farrell (1987), Segerson (1988),
and Xepapadeas (1991) discuss the ine¢ ciencies produced by environmental regulation when the
policymaker is uninformed about ￿rms￿cost structure. Our model also analyzes a context of in-
complete information but, unlike the previous papers, we focus on settings where the regulator
has relatively accurate information about the incumbent￿ s costs while the potential entrant is un-
4Stavins (1996) expands on Weitzman￿ s paper allowing for correlation between bene￿t and cost uncertainty.
4informed.5 This study contributes to the above literature by analyzing a context where regulator
and incumbent have interacted for long periods and, therefore, the regulator￿ s information is more
accurate than that of the potential entrant. We examine the welfare bene￿t of environmental reg-
ulation and, in particular, investigate under which conditions the role of the regulator can actually
be more welfare-improving under incomplete than under complete information.
Standard entry-deterrence models, such as Milgrom and Roberts (1982), Harrington (1986), and
Ridley (2008), consider industries where the incumbent￿ s production does not generate negative
externalities and, hence, ignore the role of the government in correcting this ine¢ ciency. Our
paper, in contrast, examines industries where these externalities are present and compares the
welfare bene￿ts of regulation under di⁄erent information contexts. In addition, we also consider
the informative e⁄ects of two signals, emission fees and output, as Milgrom and Roberts (1986) who
analyze a model of entry deterrence where the informed ￿rm uses two signals, price and advertising,
to convey the quality of its product to consumers. Similarly, Harrington (1987) and Bagwell and
Ramey (1991) examine a limit-pricing game where two incumbent duopolists signal their common
cost structure to an uninformed entrant. They show that no pooling equilibrium can be sustained
in which two ine¢ cient incumbents competing in prices overproduce in order to hide their type
from the entrant. Likewise, we demonstrate that the presence of regulator hinders the incumbent￿ s
ability to conceal information from the uninformed entrant.
The following section describes the model under complete information, as well as the welfare
bene￿ts from environmental regulation in this context. Section 3 introduces incomplete information,
where we separately consider the case of high and low priors, measuring for each of them the
welfare bene￿ts arising from regulation. Section 4 compares the welfare bene￿ts under di⁄erent
information contexts, and discusses the policy implications of our equilibrium results. Finally,
section 5 concludes.
2 Complete information
Let us examine an entry game where a monopolist incumbent is initially operating and an entrant
must decide whether or not to join the market. In addition, consider a regulator who sets an
emission fee per unit of output at every stage of the game. The incumbent￿ s constant marginal
costs are either high H or low L, i.e., 1 > cH
inc > cL
inc ￿ 0, where subscript inc denotes the
incumbent. This section analyzes the case where all players are informed about the incumbent￿ s
marginal cost, while section 3 examines the setting in which the entrant is unable to observe such
a cost. We study a two-stage game where, in the ￿rst stage, the regulator selects an emission
fee t1 and the monopolist responds by choosing an output level q. The inverse market demand is
5Barigozzi and Villeneuve (2006) also consider a a regulator who is informed about the health bene￿ts of a
particular product, and a group of potential consumers who use tax policy to form beliefs about the product quality.
Since their study does not analyze an entry-deterrence model, however, tax policy cannot a⁄ect entry patterns in the
industry.
5P(q) = 1 ￿ q. Thus, for a given fee t1, the incumbent maximizes pro￿ts by solving,
max
q
(1 ￿ q)q ￿ (cK
inc + t1)q
where K = fH;Lg denotes the incumbent￿ s type. In the second stage, a potential entrant decides
whether or not to join. The regulator then revises his environmental policy t2 and, if entry occurs,
￿rms compete as Cournot duopolists, simultaneously selecting production levels xinc and xent for
the incumbent and the entrant, respectively. Otherwise, the incumbent maintains its monopoly
power during both periods. In addition, the entrant￿ s marginal cost, cent, coincides with that of the
high-cost incumbent. The entrant must incur a ￿xed entry cost F > 0, which induces entry when
the incumbent￿ s costs are high, but deters it when they are low.6 Finally, the regulator￿ s social
welfare function considers consumer and producer surplus, tax revenue, and the environmental
damage from pollution, de￿ned as ED(X) ￿ d ￿ X2, where X denotes aggregate output.7 For
comparison purposes, we next describe output and emission fees in the subgame perfect equilibrium
of the game.
Lemma 1 (Complete information). In the ￿rst period, the regulator sets an emission fee
tK
1 = (2d ￿ 1)
1￿cK
inc










SO. Entry only occurs when the incumbent￿ s costs are high. In the second
period, if entry does not ensue (NE), the regulator maintains fees at t
K;NE
2 = tK
1 , and the incumbent
responds with an output function x
K;NE
inc (t2), which coincides with qK(t1). If entry occurs (E), the
regulator sets a second-period fee t
H;E
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3 where i = finc;entg and j 6= i.





which is decreasing in environmental damage, d, and in incumbent￿ s costs, cK
inc. Therefore, the tax
tK
1 that induces this output level is increasing in d and decreasing in cK
inc. In particular, note that
when d ￿ 0:5, the emission fee tK
1 collapses to zero. Since we analyze the e⁄ect of taxes on output
and welfare, we hereafter focus on settings where the environmental damage satis￿es d > 0:5 and,
therefore, emission fees are positive. Upon entry, the regulator seeks to induce the same socially
optimal output at the aggregate level, qK
SO. Hence, emission fee t
K;E
2 is more stringent than that




2 , since aggregate output under duopoly is more distant to the
social optimum; as in Buchanan (1969).8
6Note that if, in contrast, entry is independent of the incumbent￿ s costs, the monopolist cannot use its ￿rst-period
output as an informative signal to deter entry. Since we study the informative content of ￿rst-period actions (output
and emission fees) and their consequences on social welfare, we hereafter consider that entry is only pro￿table when
the incumbent￿ s costs are high.




2 and the resulting duopoly output for both ￿rms are positive as long as ￿rms￿costs are not extremely
6The introduction of environmental policy hence induces the socially optimal level of pollution
and, as a consequence, increases social welfare. The following proposition analyzes the welfare






which compares the social welfare with regulation, W
K;R
CI , and without regulation, W
K;NR
CI , where
subscript CI denotes a complete information setting, and superscript R (NR) refers to regulation
(no regulation, respectively).















for the low- and high-cost incumbent, respectively, where ￿ denotes the discount factor. Both WBL
CI
and WBH
CI are increasing in environmental damage, d.




CI for the low-cost incumbent,





CI in the shaded area;
￿gure 1b illustrates similar welfare levels for the high-cost incumbent. For simplicity, we consider
parameter values ￿ = 1, cL
inc = 1=4 and cH
inc = 1=2.9 Both ￿gures show that the welfare bene￿t
from regulation increases in the environmental damage, d. Hence, the presence of the regulator
becomes more welfare improving when pollution is more damaging.10








A , as described in the proof of lemma 1.
9In addition, we consider a ￿xed entry cost of F = 0:005, which guarantees entry only when the incumbent￿ s costs
are high. Speci￿cally, F exceeds the entrant￿ s duopoly pro￿ts when competing against a low-cost incumbent,
(1￿d)2
16A2 ,
but lies below its duopoly pro￿ts when facing a high-cost incumbent,
1





Other parameter combinations yield similar results and can be provided by the authors upon request.






7In the following section, we investigate the welfare bene￿ts from introducing environmental
regulation in settings where the entrant cannot observe the incumbent￿ s cost structure before joining
the industry. Section 4 then evaluates whether the welfare bene￿ts from regulation are larger in
the complete or incomplete information environment.
3 Incomplete information
In this section we examine the case where the incumbent and regulator are privately informed about
the incumbent￿ s marginal costs. This information setting describes cases where the social planner
has accumulated relatively accurate information about the incumbent￿ s cost structure over time.
The entrant, however, bases its entry decision on the observed ￿rst-period output and emission fee.
The time structure of this signaling game is as follows:
1. Nature decides the realization of the incumbent￿ s marginal costs, either high or low, with
probabilities p 2 (0;1) and 1 ￿ p, respectively. Incumbent and regulator privately observe
this realization but the entrant does not.
2. The regulator imposes a ￿rst-period environmental tax t1 on the incumbent￿ s output and the
incumbent responds choosing its ￿rst-period output level, q(t1).
3. Observing the ￿rst-period tax, t1, and the incumbent￿ s output level, q(t1), the entrant forms
beliefs about the incumbent￿ s marginal costs. Let ￿(cH
incjq(t1);t1) denote the entrant￿ s pos-
terior belief that the incumbent￿ s costs are high. Given these beliefs, the entrant decides
whether or not to enter the industry.11
4. If entry does not occur, the regulator imposes a second-period tax, t
K;NE
2 , and the incumbent




2 ). If, in contrast, entry ensues, the
entrant observes the incumbent￿ s costs and the regulator imposes a second-period tax, t
K;E
2 .









Let us brie￿ y describe the incentive compatibility conditions for the high- and low-cost incum-
bent (for a detailed explanation of these conditions, see proof of Lemma 2 in the appendix). The
high-cost incumbent selects a complete information ￿rst-period pro￿t-maximizing output function,
qH(t1), for any ￿rst-period tax t1. It chooses qH(t1), rather than deviating towards qA(t1), where
qA(t1) exceeds the low-cost incumbent￿ s ￿rst-period output under complete information, qL(t1), if







11As described in the previous section, when the incumbent￿ s costs are low, the entrant ￿nds entry unpro￿table
whereas, when they are high, entry is pro￿table. Denoting, for compactness, D
K
ent the entrant￿ s duopoly pro￿ts in
equilibrium under a tax t
K;E
2 when the entrant faces a K-type incumbent, this implies that D
L
ent < F < D
H
ent.
12Step 4, therefore, implies that information is revealed after entry and all agents behave as under complete
information. Hence, we hereafter focus on the informative role of ￿rst-period actions, as described in steps 1-3.
8where ￿ 2 (0;1] represents the ￿rm￿ s discount factor, MH
inc(q(t1);t1) denotes the incumbent￿ s ￿rst-




4(1+2d) is the incumbent￿ s
duopoly pro￿ts evaluated at the equilibrium fee t
H;E






1+2d represents its second-period monopoly pro￿ts at the equilibrium fee t
H;NE
2 . The
























12A2 . Thus, conditions C1-C2 guarantee the high-cost in-
cumbent does not have incentives to mimic the output decision of the low-cost ￿rm.
The next subsection focuses on equilibrium outcomes when the prior probability, p, is relatively
high, showing that only ￿informative￿ equilibria can be sustained, where the entrant can infer
the incumbent￿ s costs. Subsection 3.2 then analyzes equilibrium behavior when priors are low,
demonstrating that, in this setting, an ￿uninformative￿equilibrium can be supported where the
entrant is unable to infer the incumbent￿ s type after observing the regulator￿ s and incumbent￿ s
choices. Importantly, we demonstrate that the regulator anticipates both ￿rms￿strategic behavior
in subsequent stages and, as a consequence, can design a tax policy in the signaling game that
induces the socially optimal output.
3.1 High priors
The following proposition shows that the only strategy pro￿le that can be sustained as an infor-
mative Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) implies that the regulator selects a type-dependent
tax level13 and the incumbent responds with a type-dependent output function. Therefore, the
output level produced by the high- and low-cost ￿rms di⁄ers, allowing for information transmission
regarding the incumbent￿ s type. In addition, only the least-costly equilibrium (entailing the small-
est deviation from complete information strategies) survives the Cho and Kreps￿(1987) Intuitive
Criterion, which allows for a unique equilibrium prediction.14
13In a slight abuse of notation, we hereafter use ￿type-dependent tax￿to denote the regulator￿ s strategy when he
selects an emission fee conditional on the incumbent￿ s type, and ￿type-independent tax￿when such fee is unconditional
on the incumbent￿ s type.
14Note that the entrant could also infer accurate information about the incumbent￿ s cost structure in the following
strategy pro￿les. First, if the regulator chooses a type-dependent tax level and both types of incumbent use the
same output function, the output level that the entrant ultimately observes di⁄ers between the high- and low-cost
incumbent, allowing the entrant to deduce the incumbent￿ s production costs. Similarly, if the regulator sets a type-
independent tax level while the incumbent selects a type-dependent output function, the entrant can also infer the
incumbent￿ s type. However, none of these strategy pro￿les can be supported as a PBE, as shown in Espinola-
Arredondo et al. (2011). Intuitively, in the ￿rst strategy pro￿le, the high-cost incumbent would attract entry
by selecting a type-independent output function. Conditional on entry, it obtains a larger pro￿t deviating to the
type-dependent output function q
H(t1). Likewise, in the second strategy pro￿le, the entrant joins the market after
observing the type-independent fee t1 and output level q
H(t1). Hence, conditional on entry, the regulator facing the
high-cost incumbent can increase social welfare by deviating to the type-dependent fee t
H
1 .







where the regulator selects type-dependent emission fees (tH
1 ;tA
1 ) and the incumbent chooses output




























The entrant responds by staying out after observing output level qA(tA
1 ), but enters otherwise.




3￿+A ￿ b ￿, and emission fee tA
1 induces the socially optimal output qL
SO by solving qL
SO = qA(t1).
The low-cost incumbent hence selects an output function qA(t1) higher than under complete
information, qL(t1), in order to reveal its e¢ cient cost structure to the entrant, thus deterring
entry. The regulator, anticipating such higher production schedule, designs emission fee tA
1 in order
to induce the socially optimal output qL
SO by solving qL
SO = qA(t1); as depicted in ￿gure 2 below.
Therefore, the e¢ cient output level ￿ sustained under complete information settings with fee tL
1￿
can also be induced in the informative equilibrium by the more stringent fee tA
1 > tL
1.15 Hence,
the entrant observes a ￿rst-period output qL
SO, as under complete information, but a higher tax
tA
1 , which implies that the incumbent must be using output function qA(t1) and thus it exerts a
separating e⁄ort to convey its type.
Figure 2. Informative PBE.
Since the regulator induces the production of the socially optimal output, both under complete
information and in the informative equilibrium, social welfare is the same in both information
settings. The introduction of regulation in the informative equilibrium, however, can yield larger
welfare bene￿ts than under complete information. As in the previous section, let us next measure
15In addition, note that the low-cost incumbent ￿nds it pro￿table to separate from its complete-information output
function in order to deter entry only if the potential entrant is relatively e¢ cient, i.e., competition in the post-entry
game would be ￿tough,￿as indicated by condition c
H
inc < b ￿. This conditions guarantees that output function q
A(t1)
lies above q
L(t1) in ￿gure 2.






pares social welfare with and without regulation when priors are high, p > p, and, thus, agents
behave as prescribed in the informative equilibrium.
Proposition 2. When priors are high, the presence of the regulator in the incomplete infor-






when the incumbent￿ s costs are low, which is strictly positive for all parameter values. When the






coincides with that under complete information, WBH
CI, for all parameter values.
Under no regulation, the low-cost incumbent increases its ￿rst-period output, relative to com-
plete information, in order to signal its type to potential entrants. Such overproduction hence
generates more pollution than in complete information contexts, which suggests that an additional
form of ine¢ ciency emerges in the incomplete information setting, implying that the regulator￿ s
task becomes more bene￿cial in this context. (Section 4 con￿rms this result by comparing the wel-
fare bene￿ts of regulation in the incomplete information game, WBL
HighPriors, and in its complete
information version, WBL
CI).
Finally, when the incumbent￿ s costs are high, regulation yields the same welfare level as under




CI , since, as described in lemma 2, incumbent and
regulator￿ s actions coincide in both information contexts. Similarly, when the regulator is absent,





Therefore, the welfare bene￿ts satisfy WBH
HighPriors = WBH
CI, which are strictly positive.16
Comparative statics. Let us next examine the comparative statics behind our equilibrium
results. The ￿gure below illustrates how the welfare bene￿ts of introducing a regulator change as
the cost-di⁄erential increases.
Figure 3. E⁄ects of cH
inc on WBL
HighPriors:
16Hence, the graphical representation of the welfare bene￿t from introducing regulation for the high-cost incumbent,
WB
H
HighPriors, coincides with that in ￿gure 1b for the complete information game, WB
H
CI.
11Speci￿cally, when the cost-di⁄erential between the incumbent and entrant is small, e.g., cL
inc =
0:25 and cent = 0:26, the low-cost ￿rm is threatened by a though potential competitor, since
the entrant￿ s marginal costs are close to those of the incumbent. In this setting, the incumbent is
willing to substantially overproduce in order to reveal its type and avoid entry. Such overproduction,
however, entails more pollution and, therefore, the presence of the regulator yields higher welfare
bene￿ts; as depicted in the highest curve of ￿gure 3.17 In contrast, when the cost-di⁄erential
is large, e.g., cL
inc = 0:25 and cent = 0:5, the incumbent enjoys a cost advantage relative to the
entrant. Since the incumbent, hence, does not feel threatened, it does not exert a strong separating
e⁄ort in order to reveal its type, thus generating lower levels of pollution. The regulator￿ s task,
therefore, becomes less necessary when the ￿rms￿cost di⁄erential is large, as illustrated in the
lowest WBL
HighPriors curve in ￿gure 3. The next ￿gure represents the e⁄ect of di⁄erent discount
factors on the welfare bene￿ts from regulation
Figure 4. E⁄ects of ￿ on WBL
HighPriors
Figure 4 demonstrates that an increase in the discount factor produces an upward shift in the
welfare bene￿ts from regulation, WBL
HighPriors. Intuitively, when the discount factor is close to
one, future monopoly bene￿ts become more important. Hence, the unregulated low-cost incumbent
is willing to overproduce in order to reap the future pro￿ts from deterring entry, generating, as a
consequence, more pollution. The regulator￿ s presence, therefore, entails a larger welfare bene￿t.
A converse argument applies when the discount factor is low, e.g., ￿ = 1=3. In this setting, the
incumbent assigns a low value to the future monopoly pro￿ts from deterring entry, thus reducing its
incentives to overproduce in order to reveal its type. Therefore, the welfare bene￿ts from regulation
are small.




1+2d . In our parametric example where c
L
inc = 0:25, this implies that monopoly pro￿ts range from
0:26 when d = 1=2 to 0:17 when d = 1. Therefore, when the environmental damage from pollution, d, is relatively
high and the cost di⁄erential among ￿rms is small, introducing environmental regulation yields welfare bene￿ts which
are similar in size to the pro￿ts of an e¢ cient incumbent.
123.2 Low priors
In this subsection, we examine equilibrium behavior where priors are su¢ ciently low, p ￿ p. For
simplicity, we hereafter focus on the case where ￿ ￿ 1=2, implying that the incumbent assigns
a su¢ ciently large weight to future pro￿ts, thus making the threat of entry relevant. When the
regulator is absent, standard entry-deterrence models predict that the high-cost incumbent mimics
the production decision of the low-cost ￿rm, in order to be perceived as an e¢ cient ￿rm, and thus
deter entry. The following lemma shows that, in the presence of environmental regulation, such
entry-deterring practice can only be exercised under a more restrictive set of parameter conditions.
Lemma 3. When priors are su¢ ciently low, p ￿ p, an uninformative PBE can be sustained
where the regulator selects a type-independent emission fee tL
1, both types of incumbent choose output








Intuitively, an uninformative strategy pro￿le requires both an overtaxation from the regulator
(who sets a fee tL
1 > tH
1 to the high-cost incumbent mimicking the fee for the low-cost ￿rm), and
an overproduction from the high-cost incumbent, who chooses an output function qL(t1) in order
to mimic the output decision of the low-cost ￿rm. Ultimately, this strategy pro￿le entails the
production of output level qL(tL
1) = qL
SO, rather than the socially optimal output qH
SO that arises
under complete information; as depicted in ￿gure 5 below.
Figure 5. Uninformative PBE.





setting (see proof of lemma 3 for details), which is increasing in the cost-asymmetry between ￿rms,
since the di⁄erence between tH
1 and tL
1 enlarges. On the other hand, overtaxing the incumbent
deters entry, yielding a second-period welfare gain, due to savings in the ￿xed entry cost F. In
particular, the regulator designs second-period emission fees to induce output level qH
SO independent
of the entry decision.18 This entails that second-period welfare when entry is deterred is larger than




1 , which induces the socially optimal
13when entry ensues, given the savings in the entry cost. Hence, when the ￿rst-period welfare loss
from overtaxation is o⁄set by the second-period welfare gain from deterring entry, the regulator
behaves as prescribed in the uninformative equilibrium, which occurs when the cost di⁄erential is
su¢ ciently low, i.e., cH
inc < ￿.19 In addition, the high-cost incumbent mimics the output decision
of the low-cost ￿rm if its cost ￿disadvantage￿is not very strong, cH
inc < ￿. In this case, the second-
period monopoly pro￿ts that the incumbent obtains from deterring entry outweigh the costs that
this ￿rm incurs by overproducing. Ultimately, the actions of both incumbent and regulator help
the former conceal its type from the potential entrant, who stays out given its low priors.
Let us next compare entry deterrence with and without regulator. When the regulator is








5￿￿9 ￿ ￿,20 whereas when the regulator is present this equilibrium
can be supported under more restrictive conditions, since cH
inc < ￿ < ￿. Therefore, environmental
policy hinders the incumbent￿ s ability to practice entry deterrence. Intuitively, the regulator￿ s
overtaxation makes the incumbent￿ s overproduction e⁄ort more costly, thus shrinking the set of
costs under which this ￿rm practices entry deterrence. The following proposition evaluates the
welfare bene￿ts from introducing environmental regulation in this information context.
Proposition 3. When priors are low, the presence of the regulator in the incomplete informa-






incumbent￿ s costs are high, which is strictly positive for all parameter values. When the incumbent￿ s





LowPriors, which coincides with
that under complete information, WBL
CI, for all parameter values.
Standard entry-deterrence models, where the regulator is absent, as Milgrom and Roberts
(1982), prescribe that the high-cost incumbent mimics the output function of the low-cost ￿rm
(overproduces) in order to conceal its type from the potential entrant and, thus, avoid entry. This
overproduction yields a pollution level above the social optimum, thereby generating a large en-
vironmental damage during the ￿rst-period game. When the regulator is present, however, his
overtaxation reduces the incumbent￿ s production thus decreasing environmental damage. In the
second period, the environmental damage from pollution is not internalized when the regulator is
absent, while it is when he is present. Therefore, environmental policy yields a larger social welfare
both in the ￿rst and second period, thus entailing a positive welfare bene￿t WBH
LowPriors > 0.21 Fig-
output q
H
SO. Similarly, if entry occurs, the regulator selects a tax t
H;E
2 which also induces output q
H
SO.
19More formally, the regulator selects t
L





2￿(1+2d) < F. This condition is, however, only compatible with the assumption of pro￿table
competition against the high-cost incumbent, D
L








ent, which holds when c
H
inc < ￿.
20When the regulator is absent, our model resembles that of standard entry-deterrence games, as Milgrom and
Roberts (1982). For more details about the uninformative equilibrium without regulation, see Appendix 1.
21When the incumbent￿ s costs are low, the actions of both regulator and incumbent coincide with those under
14ure 6 describes how the welfare bene￿ts from introducing environmental regulation, WBH
LowPriors,
are a⁄ected by changes in this ￿rm￿ s production costs.
Figure 6. E⁄ects of cH
inc on WBH
LowPriors
Unlike our results regarding the welfare bene￿ts of regulation when priors are high (￿gure 3),
an increase in the cost di⁄erential between the low- and high-cost incumbent produces an upward
shift in the welfare bene￿ts associated with having a regulator. Intuitively, when the regulator is
absent, an equilibrium can be sustained in which the high-cost incumbent chooses to increase its
output in order to mimic the low-cost ￿rm, and deter entry. As this cost di⁄erential increases, the
ine¢ cient ￿rm must increase the extent of its overproduction, thus entailing a larger pollution. The
regulator￿ s task, therefore, becomes more necessary in this setting, shifting WBH
LowPriors upwards.
If, in contrast, the costs of the high- and low-cost incumbent are relatively similar, the ine¢ cient
￿rm does not need to substantially increase its output level in order to mimic the output decision of
the e¢ cient ￿rm, generating a small increase in pollution and, hence, the bene￿ts from introducing
environmental regulation decline.22
4 Welfare comparisons
Let us now examine whether the welfare bene￿ts of regulation, despite being positive in both
information contexts, are larger under complete or incomplete information settings.
Proposition 4. The welfare bene￿t from environmental regulation under incomplete informa-










complete information, which holds both when the regulator is present and when he is absent. We, therefore, focus
on equilibrium behavior when the incumbent￿ s costs are high.
22Similarly as in contexts where priors are high, an increase in the discount factor produces an upward shift on the
welfare bene￿ts from regulation; as described in ￿gure 4.
15for any incumbent￿ s costs K = fH;Lg. When priors are low, in contrast, the welfare bene￿t
from environmental regulation under complete information is larger than that under incomplete
information.
First, note that when priors are relatively high, the informative equilibrium emerges and the
regulator designs environmental policy to induce the socially optimal output, qL
SO, both under





CI , as depicted in ￿gure 7.23
Figure 7. Comparison of WB under high priors.
However, under no regulation, social welfare does not coincide in both information contexts.
Speci￿cally, in the informative equilibrium, the low-cost incumbent exerts a separating e⁄ort (rel-
ative to complete information) in order to reveal its type and deter entry. When the regulator
is absent, such an overproduction entails a larger environmental damage than in complete infor-
mation contexts. Intuitively, under complete information an ine¢ ciency exists, arising from the
fact that ￿rms do not internalize the external e⁄ects from pollution. Under incomplete informa-
tion, such ine¢ ciency is emphasized by the incumbent￿ s overproduction, thus decreasing social



























larges when the cost di⁄erential (cent ￿ cL
inc) decreases; as illustrated in ￿gure 8. Intuitively, when
both types of ￿rms experience similar production costs, the low-cost incumbent faces a tough com-
petitor it seeks to deter. Hence, the incumbent increases its overproduction in order to convey its






16type to the potential entrant, generating more pollution, thus making the regulator￿ s role more
welfare improving; as represented by the highest curve of ￿gure 8.
Figure 8. Di⁄-in-Di⁄. with high priors.
Unlike the case of high priors, the presence of the regulator does not guarantee the production of
the socially optimal output when priors are low. Speci￿cally, overtaxation and overproduction yield
an output level qL(tL
1) = qL
SO, above the socially optimal level for the high-cost incumbent, qH
SO.
Under complete information, in contrast, environmental policy achieves a socially optimal output




LowPriors; as depicted in ￿gure
9a below. When the regulator is absent, each information context also yields a di⁄erent welfare
result. In particular, the practice of entry deterrence by the high-cost incumbent produces a ￿rst-
period negative e⁄ect and a second-period positive e⁄ect on welfare. On one hand, the negative
e⁄ect stems from the incumbent￿ s overproduction in order to mimic the low-cost ￿rm, yielding a
larger pollution level than under complete information.24 On the other hand, the incumbent￿ s entry
deterrence causes a positive e⁄ect since only the monopoly output is produced in the second-period
game, which yields a lower pollution level than under complete information, where a duopoly market
operates. When the high-cost incumbent is relatively e¢ cient,25 it exerts a small mimicking e⁄ort,




CI , as depicted in ￿gure 9a.





CI . However, note that this ￿rm cannot be extremely ine¢ cient,
since otherwise the uninformative equilibrium would not exist. Thus, W
H;NR
LowPriors does not lie
substantially below W
H;NR
CI under any combination of parameter values. As a consequence, welfare
24A given increase in ￿rst-period output produces a positive e⁄ect, due to a larger consumer surplus, but it
also generates a negative e⁄ect, since pollution increases environmental damage. Given that d > 0:5, the negative
dominates the positive e⁄ect, entailing an overall negative e⁄ect on ￿rst-period welfare.
25For more details about the cost cuto⁄ for which social welfare in the complete information game exceeds that
under incomplete information, see proof of Proposition 4.
17bene￿t WBH
CI is still larger than WBH
LowPriors, i.e., the di⁄erence in welfare bene￿ts WBH
LowPriors￿
WBH
CI is negative, but approaches zero when the high-cost incumbent becomes more ine¢ cient, as
shown in the highest curve in ￿gure 9b. The welfare bene￿t of regulation is therefore larger under
complete than incomplete information, i.e., WBH
CI > WBH
LowPriors, for all parameter values under
which the uninformative equilibrium can be supported.
Figure 9a. Comparison of WB under low priors. Figure 9b. Di⁄-in-Di⁄. with low priors.
















can be intuitively understood as the estimation error that arises from measuring the welfare bene￿ts
of environmental regulation assuming a complete information context where, in fact, the industry
operates in an incomplete information setting. (A similar argument is applicable for the case
of high priors.) If such estimation error is positive, ignoring the incomplete information context
where ￿rms interact leads to an underestimation of the welfare bene￿t of introducing environmental
policy; as observed in ￿gure 8 where priors are high. By contrast, if such estimation error is negative,
ignoring the incomplete information framework entails an overestimation of the bene￿ts associated
with environmental regulation; as depicted in ￿gure 9b.
4.1 Discussion
Cost-reducing policies. Our results suggest that government policies aimed at reducing the produc-
tion costs of polluting ￿rms can entail extremely di⁄erent welfare implications, depending on the
information available to entrants and the industry characteristics. In particular, our conclusions
in the informative equilibrium of section 3.1 demonstrate that a policy that helps the incumbent
￿rm reduce its production costs, thus enlarging the cost di⁄erential relative to the entrant, leads
it to behave more similarly to the complete information game. As a result, the welfare bene￿ts
of environmental regulation in this setting approach those of the complete information context.
Therefore, when the cost di⁄erential among ￿rms is relatively small, the regulator can essentially
18ignore the information context in which the industry operates, since the welfare bene￿ts associated
with his intervention are approximately the same. In contrast, when priors are relatively low, and
the equilibrium outcomes in section 3.2 emerge, a reduction in the ￿rms￿cost di⁄erential implies a
larger welfare bene￿t of environmental regulation under complete than under incomplete informa-
tion settings. Unlike in the context where priors are high, programs that reduce the cost di⁄erential
among ￿rms make more relevant the consideration of the information available to ￿rms that seek
to enter the industry. Speci￿cally, ignoring the information context where the industry operates
can, in this case, lead to an overestimation of the welfare bene￿ts associated with environmental
protection agencies, such as the EPA in the United States.
An ￿almost inactive￿ EPA that only manages information. If emission fees are politically
unattractive, the EPA can, nonetheless, strategically manage the information context in which the
industry operates, by revealing or concealing the incumbent￿ s cost structure to ￿rms interested
in entering the market. Our results suggest that, under high priors, the EPA should promote
complete information, since a larger social welfare can be obtained in this case than under the




HighPriors. Intuitively, because the low-cost incumbent
does not need to overproduce in order to convey its type to potential entrants, lower levels of
pollution are generated, thus increasing social welfare. By contrast, when priors are relatively low,
the EPA might strategically choose to conceal information about the incumbent￿ s costs, depending
on the cost di⁄erential between the incumbent and the entrant. Speci￿cally, when the incumbent
is relatively e¢ cient, our results imply that the welfare that arises under incomplete information




CI , leading the regulator to conceal





CI , inducing the regulator to reveal such information to the entrant.
It is important to mention that the strategic dissemination of information by the EPA only serves
as a second-best regulation. Indeed, it helps dissipate one form of ine¢ ciency (overproduction in
incomplete information settings) but does not eliminate the ine¢ ciency that arises in complete
information contexts, where the incumbent does not internalize the negative welfare e⁄ects of its
production decision.
Firms￿opposition to environmental regulation. Our results also predict that, despite the wel-
fare properties of environmental policy in both information contexts, ￿rms￿pro￿ts decrease more
signi￿cantly in incomplete than in complete information settings. Speci￿cally, regulation becomes
more stringent, both under high and low priors, ultimately reducing pro￿ts. As a consequence, we
can anticipate ￿rms to especially oppose environmental regulation when the agency has relatively
accurate information after long periods of interaction with the incumbent while the potential en-
trant, in contrast, has access to less precise information. Our ￿ndings therefore predict that the
threat of entry in industries that have been monopolized for several years leads the regulator to
impose more stringent policies. His task nonetheless faces a stronger opposition by regulated ￿rms,
thus emphasizing the recurrent con￿ ict between regulator and ￿rms, and providing more incentives
for ￿rms to lobby against environmental policy reform.
195 Conclusions
This paper evaluates the welfare bene￿ts of introducing environmental regulation in a monopolized
market that is subject to the threat of entry, not only under complete information settings, but also
under incomplete information contexts, where the entrant must use the regulator￿ s tax policy and
the incumbent￿ s output decision to infer the incumbent￿ s productivity. Under complete informa-
tion, we identify an ine¢ ciency arising from ￿rms not internalizing the environmental externality
they generate. Importantly, such ine¢ ciency is emphasized in contexts of incomplete information,
where the incumbent overproduces in order to convey its cost structure to potential entrants and
thus deter entry, which occurs when priors are high, or to conceal it by mimicking the output
decision of the e¢ cient ￿rm, when priors are low. Therefore, the welfare bene￿t of regulation in
incomplete information contexts is generally larger than under complete information. In addition,
our results also identify under which conditions an under- or over-estimation of the welfare bene￿ts
of environmental regulation arises from ignoring the information setting in which ￿rms interact.
Our paper considers that the regulator has interacted with the incumbent for a relatively long
period of time and, as a consequence, can infer its production costs more accurately than the
potential entrant does. In some recently developed industries, however, the regulator lacks such
extended interaction, and he is then as uninformed as the potential entrant. Such analysis would
introduce additional layers of uncertainty into our entry-deterring game, since one more agent (the
regulator) is uninformed. This setting would help us evaluate if one of the general ￿ndings in
this paper ￿ that the introduction of uncertainty leads to more ine¢ ciencies and, thus, enlarges
the welfare bene￿ts from environmental regulation￿ is further intensi￿ed when more players are
uninformed. Furthermore, we examine ￿ ow externalities, since the negative e⁄ects of pollution
dissipate across periods. A natural extension, hence, would allow for ￿rst-period pollution to still
impose negative e⁄ects on second-period welfare, thus inducing a more stringent regulation that
accounts for these intertemporal e⁄ects.
206 Appendix
6.1 Appendix 1 - Unregulated high-cost incumbent
In the absence of environmental regulation, the high-cost incumbent is willing to mimic the low-















for the low-cost ￿rm. Speci￿cally, note that output qL and qH in this context are not a function of
emission fee t1 since the regulator is absent. The incentive compatibility condition for the low-cost
incumbent holds since by selecting qL it deters entry, and qL maximizes its ￿rst-period pro￿ts.
The incentive compatibility condition of the high-cost ￿rm, however, does not necessarily hold for
all parameter values. In particular, the ￿rst-period monopoly pro￿ts that this incumbent obtains











4 . In the second period, if entry is deterred, this incumbent reaps
monopoly pro￿ts of M
H
inc, which coincide with MH
inc(qH). If, in contrast, entry ensues, then the




9 . Hence, the high-cost incumbent￿ s incentive
compatibility condition holds if
￿(1 ￿ cH






(9 + 4￿)(1 ￿ cH
inc)2
36








5￿￿9 ￿ ￿. (Note that our parametric examples
satisfy this condition since, for ￿ = 1 and cL
inc = 1=4, this cuto⁄ becomes cH
inc < 0:57.) Finally, the
entrant cannot update its beliefs after observing qL, and thus coincide with the prior probability
￿(qL) = p, leading the entrant to stay out given that priors satisfy p < p.
6.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Given a second-period fee t2, under no entry the K-type incumbent solves
max
xinc











2 . The social planner seeks to induce an
output level that maximizes social welfare,
max
xinc
CS(xinc) + PS(xinc) + T
K;NE
2 ￿ d ￿ (xinc)
2
where CS(xinc) ￿ 1





xinc, denote consumer and
producer surplus, respectively, and T
K;NE
2 ￿ t2xinc represents tax revenue under no entry. Taking




1+2d . Hence, the emission fee
t2 that induces the monopolist to produce xK












1+2d , or t
K;NE
2 = (2d￿1)xK
SO (A similar fee, tK
1 = (2d￿1)qK
SO, is implemented in the ￿rst
period, since the incumbent is the unique ￿rm operating in the market, where xK
SO = qK
SO)
In the case of entry, the incumbent (entrant) solves
max
xinc







(1 ￿ xent ￿ xinc)xent ￿ (cent + t2)xent ￿ F






3 for any ￿rm i = finc;entg where
j 6= i. The social planner seeks to induce an output level that maximizes
max
X
CS(X) + PS(X) + TK
2 ￿ d ￿ X2
where X ￿ xinc + xent, CS(X) ￿ 1





X ￿ F, and TK
2 ￿ t2X.
Note that the producer surplus PS(X) considers the incumbent￿ s marginal costs. This is due to the
fact that, in order to allocate the production decision of the socially optimal output, a benevolent
social planner would produce using the most e¢ cient ￿rm. Speci￿cally, when the incumbent￿ s costs
are low, all socially optimal output would be produced by this ￿rm, whereas when they are high,
incumbent and entrant are equally e¢ cient, cH
inc = cent, and hence the socially optimal output





1+2d , which coincides with xK
SO. Finally, in order to ￿nd fee t
K;E
2 and












































2 , when the incumbent￿ s costs are high, which is strictly positive if d > 1
4, a condition
that holds given that d > 1
2 by assumption. Substituting t
H;E


























2A , where A ￿ 1 + 2d and B ￿ 2 ￿ 2d. Hence, the equilibrium output





























A . In addition, the emission
fee t
L;E




A ; as depicted in the ￿gure below.





A , however, holds for all cH
inc > cL
inc since it originates at the negative
quadrant (when cL
inc = 0, the cuto⁄ originates at ￿ 1
A) and reaches cH















A . Indeed, both cuto⁄s reach cH
inc = 1 when cL
inc = 1, but
1+2dcL
inc





A originates at a higher vertical intercept 4d￿1
A , since 4d ￿ 1 > 1 given that d > 1
2.




A is binding and, in order to have a positive emission fee that






A ; as indicated in the shaded area of the ￿gure. ￿
6.3 Proof of Proposition 1





























1 = (2d ￿ 1)
1￿cL
inc






2+2d . Second-period welfare, W
L;R
2;CI, coincides with ￿rst-period welfare, W
L;R
1;CI, since

















When the regulator is absent, i.e., tL
1 = t
L;NE






and similarly for second-period welfare, W
L;NR


















(1 ￿ 2d)2(1 + ￿)(1 ￿ cL
inc)2
8(1 + 2d)





(2d ￿ 1)(3 + 2d)(1 + ￿)(1 ￿ cL
inc)2
4(1 + 2d)2
is positive for all d > 1=2.




















1 ) + tH
1 ￿ qH(tH







1 = (2d ￿ 1)
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X2 + PS(X) + T
H;E
2 ￿ d ￿ X2























2+4d ￿F, which coincides with W
H;R
1;CI (except for the entry cost, F) given that
the regulator induces the same socially optimal output qH
SO in both periods. Therefore, overall









2+4d ￿ ￿F. When the regulator is absent,





8 . The second-period welfare, W
H;NR



































[4d(1 + d)(9 + 16￿) ￿ 27 ￿ 20￿](1 ￿ cH
inc)2
36(1 + 2d)2
is positive, given that 4d(1 + d)(9 + 16￿) ￿ 27 ￿ 20￿ > 0 for all d > 1=2 and ￿ 2 [0;1]. ￿
6.4 Proof of Lemma 2
We next show that the only informative strategy pro￿le that can be sustained in equilibrium has
both the incumbent and the regulator selecting type-dependent strategies. The strategy pro￿le
where only the incumbent (or only the regulator) chooses a type-dependent strategy cannot be
supported as a PBE; as shown in Proposition 1 in Espinola-Arredondo et. al. (2011). We then
show that a strategy pro￿le where both informed agents select a type-dependent strategy can be
sustained as a PBE.
In particular, the regulator chooses emission fees (tH
1 ;t
L;sep
1 ) where t
L;sep
1 ￿ tL
1 and the incumbent
selects output function qH(t1) when its costs are high and qL;sep(t1) when its costs are low.
￿ High-cost incumbent. After observing emission fee tH












1 ) + ￿DH
inc holds given that
qH(tH
1 ) maximizes ￿rst-period pro￿ts. In particular, after observing fee tH
1 but output level
qL;sep(tH




1 ) = 1. A similar argument holds for the case in which emission fee tH
1 is
followed by deviations to any o⁄-the-equilibrium output function q(t1) 6= qH(t1) 6= qL;sep(t1),
where the entrant￿ s beliefs also induce him to enter. After observing any emission fee t1 6= tH
1 ,







where entry is deterred when it selects qL;sep(t1) since ￿(cH
incjqL;sep(t1);t1) = 0 for all t1 6= tH
1 .
This holds for the equilibrium fee t1 = t
L;sep





1, the entrant only relies on output level qL;sep(t
00
1) to infer the incumbent￿ s type.
￿ Low-cost incumbent. The incumbent selects output level qL;sep(t
L;sep
1 ) after observing the















1 ) + ￿DL
inc
25is satis￿ed. A similar argument holds for the case in which emission fee t
L;sep
1 is followed
by deviations to any o⁄-the-equilibrium output function q(t1) 6= qH(t1) 6= qL;sep(t1). In
particular, the type-dependent emission fee allows the entrant to infer the incumbent￿ s type
when the output function is q(t1). Conditional on entry, the most pro￿table deviation is
qL(t
L;sep















1 ) + ￿DL
inc
where the entrant infers that the incumbent￿ s cost must be low since output level qL;sep(t
L;sep
1 )
con￿rms the emission fee t
L;sep
1 . A similar argument is applicable for any o⁄-the-equilibrium










since in this case the entrant only relies on the observed output level to infer the incumbent￿ s
type. After observing tH
1 , the low-cost incumbent selects qL;sep(tH









inc since, given entry, qL(tH
1 ) maximizes the incumbent￿ s ￿rst-
period pro￿ts. However, this condition cannot hold, and therefore the low-cost incumbent
selects qL;sep(t1) for t1 6= tH
1 , but qL(t1) otherwise.
￿ Regulator. He chooses an emission fee tH






2 ), which holds by de￿nition for any t1. Speci￿cally, if condition C1 holds, the
high-cost incumbent selects qH(t1), which attracts entry regardless of the emission fee set by
the regulator. If, in contrast, the incumbent￿ s costs are low, from condition C2 the regulator
can anticipate that any fee t1 6= tH
1 induces the low-cost incumbent to respond with output
function qL;sep(t1), which deters entry. Conditional on no entry, the regulator hence selects
the emission fee that maximizes SWL;NE(t1;t
L;NE
2 ), provided that the low-cost incumbent










As shown in Espinola-Arredondo et. al. (2011), the only equilibrium that survives the Cho
and Kreps￿(1987) Intuitive Criterion is that where the low-cost incumbent selects output function
q(t1) = qA(t1), where qA(t1) solves C1, and the regulator sets a fee tA
1 that solves qA(t1) = qL
SO






￿ p, where p > 0 for all F > DL
ent and p < 1 for all F < DH
ent.











A . Similarly, the incentive compatibility condition for the low-cost
incumbent, C2, holds (when evaluated at the equilibrium fee tA
1 and output qA(tA






3￿+A ￿ b ￿. ￿
266.5 Proof of Proposition 2






HighPriors, let us separately ￿nd the welfare arising in the informative equilibrium
when the regulator is present, W
L;R
HighPriors, and when he is absent, W
L;NR
HighPriors. When the regulator





2A , whereas in the case that he is absent,
for compactness, we provide the expression of W
L;NR






























3 + 2d(26d ￿ 21)
￿
128A2 : (A.4)
Note that if ￿ = 1 and cL
inc = 1=4 are ￿xed, while cH
inc decreases to cH









3 + 2d(290d ￿ 177)
￿
1152A2 :
which is larger than A.4 (where cH
inc = 1=2). Similarly, ￿xing parameters cH
inc = 1=2 and cL
inc = 1=4,







2 + 2d(10d ￿ 9)
￿
64A2 :
which is lower than A.4 (where ￿ = 1).
High-cost incumbent. In this case, both regulator and incumbent select the same actions under





















6.6 Proof of Lemma 3
In the uninformative strategy pro￿le, the regulator sets a type-independent emission fee t0
1 and
the incumbent selects a type-independent ￿rst-period output function q(t1) for any emission fee
t1. After observing equilibrium fee t0
1 and output level q(t0




1) = p, which coincide with the prior probability distribution. After observing a
deviation from the regulator t00
1 6= t0
1, the entrant￿ s o⁄-the-equilibrium beliefs cannot be updated
using Bayes￿rule, and for simplicity, we assume that ￿(cH
incjq(t00
1);t00
1) = 1. A similar argument can
be made when only the incumbent deviates towards an output function q0(t0
1) 6= q(t0
1) while the









Therefore, after observing an equilibrium emission fee t0
1 and an equilibrium output level q(t0
1),
the entrant enters if its expected pro￿t from entering satis￿es p￿DH
ent +(1￿p)￿DL







￿ p, where p 2 (0;1) by de￿nition. Hence, if p > p entry occurs; otherwise the entrant
stays out. Note that if p > p, entry occurs when t0
1 and q(t0
1) are selected, which cannot be optimal
for both types of incumbent, inducing them to select qK(t0
1). But since qH(t0
1) 6= qL(t0
1) this strategy
cannot be a pooling equilibrium. Thus, it must be that p ￿ p, inducing the entrant to stay out. Let
us check the conditions under which the high-cost incumbent chooses output function q(t1). After
observing an equilibrium fee of t0






If, instead, the incumbent deviates towards an o⁄-the-equilibrium output q0(t0
1) 6= q(t0
1), entry




inc, which are maximized at q0(t0
1) = qH(t0
1).


























After observing an o⁄-the-equilibrium fee t00
1 6= t0
1, entry ensues regardless of the incumbent￿ s output








inc cannot hold by de￿nition.
Similarly for the low-cost incumbent. If, after observing equilibrium fee t0
1, it selects equilibrium
output level q(t0





inc. However, if it deviates towards q0(t0
1)




inc, which are maximized at q0(t0
1) = qL(t0
1).


























After observing an o⁄-the-equilibrium fee t00
1 6= t0
1, entry ensues regardless of the incumbent￿ s output
function, and therefore, q(t00
1) is not optimal for the low-cost ￿rm.
Let us now examine the regulator￿ s incentives to choose a type-independent emission fee t0
1.
When the incumbent￿ s costs are high, the regulator obtains SWH;NE(t0
1;t
H;NE
2 ) by selecting t0
1. If,
instead, he deviates to any o⁄-the-equilibrium fee t00
1 6= t0
1, the incumbent selects qH(t00
1) and entry
ensues. Hence, he obtains SWH;E(t00
1;t
H;E
2 ), which is maximized at the complete information fee
t00
1 = tH









Let us next analyze this condition. In particular, fee t
H;NE
2 induces socially optimal output given
no entry in the second-period game. Similarly, fee t
H;E
2 induces socially optimal output given entry
in the second-period game. Hence, output level coincides in both settings but the entrant incurs a
￿xed entry cost (reducing social welfare) if fee tH
1 is selected in the ￿rst-period game. Regarding
￿rst-period welfare, we can observe that fee tH
1 induces socially optimal output, qH(tH







1 ) since qL
SO > qH
SO, thereby inducing
28an ine¢ cient output level. Therefore, the fee t0
1 entails a ￿rst-period welfare loss relative to the
complete information fee tH
1 , but avoids incurring a discounted entry cost ￿F. Hence, when the
￿rst-period welfare loss exceeds the ￿xed entry cost, the regulator facing a high-cost incumbent
is not willing to choose a type-dependent fee t0
1, and an uninformative strategy pro￿le cannot be
supported as a PBE. Otherwise, the regulator is willing to choose t0
1 and the uninformative strategy
pro￿le can be sustained as a PBE.
Intuitive Criterion. We next show that the type-independent output function q(t1) = qL(t1)
survives the Cho and Kreps￿(1987) Intuitive Criterion, and then demonstrate that, given this
output function, only the type-independent fee t0
1 = tL
1 survives this equilibrium re￿nement.
Incumbent, case 1a. Let us ￿rst check if the type-independent ￿rst-period output function
q(t1) < qL(t1) survives the Cho and Kreps￿(1987) Intuitive Criterion for any t1. For simplicity,
we ￿rst analyze the case where q(t1) < qH(t1) < qL(t1) and then that in which qH(t1) < q(t1) <
qL(t1). On one hand, the highest pro￿t that the low-cost incumbent obtains by deviating towards
q0(t1) 6= q(t1) is ML
inc(q0(t1);t1)+￿M
L




for any q0(t1) 2 (q(t1);qL(t1)) due to the concavity of the pro￿t function. On the other hand, the
high-cost incumbent obtains MH
inc(q(t1);t1) + ￿M
H
inc in equilibrium. If instead, it deviates towards
q0(t1) 6= q(t1), MH
inc(q0(t1);t1) + ￿M
H
inc is the highest pro￿t that it can obtain, which exceeds its






after observing a deviation q0(t1) 2 (qH(t1);qL(t1)). (Otherwise, the entrant￿ s beliefs are una⁄ected;
since either both types of incumbent, or neither, have incentives to deviate.) Therefore, after
observing a deviation q0(t1) 2 (qH(t1);qL(t1)), the entrant believes that the incumbent￿ s cost must
be low, and does not enter. Under these updated beliefs, the pro￿t obtained by the low-cost
incumbent from deviating exceeds its equilibrium pro￿ts. Hence, the low-cost incumbent deviates
towards q0(t1) and the uninformative PBE where q(t1) < qH(t1) < qL(t1) violates the Intuitive
Criterion for any fee t1.
Let us now examine the case where the equilibrium output function q(t1) satis￿es qH(t1) <
q(t1) < qL(t1). On one hand, the highest pro￿t that the low-cost incumbent can obtain by deviating
towards q0(t1) 6= q(t1) is ML
inc(q0(t1);t1)+￿M
L
inc, which exceeds its equilibrium pro￿t for any q0(t1) 2
(q(t1);qL(t1)]. On the other hand, the highest pro￿t that the high-cost incumbent can obtain by
deviating towards q0(t1) 6= q(t1) is MH
inc(q0(t1);t1)+￿M
H
inc, which exceeds its equilibrium pro￿t for
any q0(t1) 2 [qH(t1);q(t1)). Therefore, after observing any deviation q0(t1) 2 (q(t1);qL(t1)], the
entrant believes that the incumbent￿ s costs must be low, and does not enter. Under these updated
beliefs, the pro￿t that the low-cost incumbent obtains deviating is larger than its equilibrium pro￿ts.
Hence, the uninformative PBE where q(t1) < qL(t1) also violates the Intuitive Criterion.
Incumbent, case 1b. Next let us check if the type-independent ￿rst-period output q(t1) >








inc by deviating towards qL(t1), which also exceeds its equi-
librium pro￿ts, given that qH(t1) < qL(t1) < q(t1). Therefore, both types of incumbent have incen-






inducing no entry. Given these beliefs, both types of incumbent deviate toward qL(t1), obtain-
ing higher pro￿ts than in equilibrium. Hence, the uninformative PBE in which both types select
q(t1) > qL(t1) also violates the Intuitive Criterion.
Incumbent, case 1c. Let us now check if the type-independent ￿rst-period output q(t1) =
qL(t1) survives the Intuitive Criterion. On one hand, ML
inc(q0(t1);t1) + ￿M
L
inc is the highest payo⁄




inc reaches its maximum at exactly q0(t1) = qL(t1). Hence, the
low-cost incumbent does not have incentives to deviate from the type-independent output function
q(t1) = qL(t1). On the other hand, MH
inc(q0(t1);t1) + ￿M
H
inc is the highest payo⁄ the high-cost
incumbent can obtain by deviating toward q0(t1) 6= qL(t1). Therefore, the high-cost incumbent does







holds for deviations closer to its ￿rst-period pro￿t-maximizing output, i.e., q0(t1) 2 [qH(t1);qL(t1)).






= 1, and enters. In contrast, its updated beliefs are una⁄ected after
observing any other deviation. The high-cost incumbent￿ s pro￿ts from deviating towards q0(t1) are
hence MH
inc(q0(t1);t1) + ￿DH







Note that deviation pro￿ts, MH
inc(q0(t1);t1)+￿DH
inc, are maximal at q0(t1) = qH(t1), yielding pro￿ts
of MH
inc(qH(t1);t1) + ￿DH






condition C7 holds for all deviations q0(t1) 2 [qH(t1);qL(t1)). Note that the last inequality holds
since the equilibrium output function q(t1) = qL(t1) satis￿es condition C4. Therefore, the high-
cost incumbent does not have incentives to deviate from qL(t1), and the type-independent output
function qL(t1) must be part of an uninformative equilibrium surviving the Intuitive Criterion.
Regulator, case 2a. Given output function qL(t1) selected by both types of incumbent, let
us ￿nally analyze the regulator￿ s equilibrium fee t0
1. Let us ￿rst consider the case where t0
1 < tL
1.
For simplicity, we ￿rst analyze the case where tH
1 < t0
1 < tL













2 ) is the highest payo⁄
that the regulator obtains. (As described in the paper, SWH;NE(tL
1;t
H;NE




since the ￿rst-period social cost from over-taxation coincides in both cases, given that the regulator
sets the same fee tL
1, whereas second-period social welfare is larger under no entry.) This deviating
payo⁄ exceeds his equilibrium welfare given that SWL;NE(tL
1;t
L;NE





1 maximizes social welfare conditional on no entry. On the other hand, the regulator facing a
high-cost incumbent obtains an equilibrium social welfare of SWH;NE(t0
1;t
H;NE
2 ). By deviating





2 ) is the highest payo⁄ that the




2 ) < SWH;NE(t0
1;t
H;NE
2 ), given that tH
1 < t0
1 < tL
1. Therefore, after observing
a deviation tL
1 6= t0
1, the entrant believes that the incumbent￿ s cost must be low, and does not





exceeds that in equilibrium, SWL;NE(t0
1;;t
L;NE
2 ). Hence, the regulator facing a low-cost incumbent
deviates towards tL





1 violates the Intuitive Criterion.
Second, let us now consider the case where t0
1 < tH
1 < tL
1. On one hand, the regulator facing
a low-cost incumbent obtains an equilibrium social welfare of SWL;NE(t0
1;t
L;NE
2 ). By deviating





2 ) is the highest payo⁄ that the
regulator obtains, which exceeds equilibrium welfare if SWL;NE(t00
1;t
L;NE








1 maximizes social welfare conditional on no en-
try. On the other hand, the regulator facing a high-cost incumbent obtains an equilibrium so-
cial welfare of SWH;NE(t0
1;t
H;NE






2 ) is the highest payo⁄that the regulator obtains, which exceeds equilibrium wel-
fare for all t00
1 2 (t0
1;tH
1 ]. Therefore, after observing a deviation t00
1 2 (tH
1 ;tL
1], the entrant believes
that the incumbent￿ s cost must be low, and does not enter. Under these updated beliefs, the social
welfare from deviating to t00
1 2 (tH
1 ;tL
1], exceeds that in equilibrium, SWL;NE(t0
1;t
L;NE
2 ). Hence, the
regulator facing a low-cost incumbent deviates towards t00
1 and the uninformative PBE where the




1, also violates the Intuitive Criterion.








2 ). By deviating towards an o⁄-the-equilibrium subsidy of tL
1 6= t0
1











2 ). On the other hand, the regulator facing a high-cost incumbent obtains an
equilibrium social welfare of SWH;NE(t0
1;t
H;NE






2 ) is the highest payo⁄ that the regulator obtains, which exceeds
his equilibrium welfare since SWH;NE(tL
1;t
H;NE
2 ) ￿ SWH;NE(t0
1;t
H;NE




Therefore, the regulator has incentives to deviate towards tL
1 for both types of incumbent and the







= p inducing no entry since p < p. Given
these beliefs, the regulator has incentives to deviate toward tL
1, obtaining higher social welfare than
in equilibrium. Hence, the uninformative strategy pro￿le where the regulator selects t0
1 > tL
1 also
violates the Intuitive Criterion.








2 ). By deviating towards an o⁄-the-equilibrium fee of t00
1 6= tL
1 the highest payo⁄




which is strictly lower than the equilibrium welfare of SWL;NE(tL
1;t
L;NE
2 ). On the other hand, the









2 ) is the highest pay-







2 ), which holds for any deviation t00
1 2 [tH
1 ;tL
1). Hence, the entrant assigns full











entry ensues. Given these updated beliefs, the social welfare that the regulator facing a high-cost




2 ), which is lower than his
equilibrium welfare if SWH;E(t00
1;t
H;E
2 ) < SWH;NE(tL
1;t
H;NE
2 ). This condition holds since, accord-
ing to condition C6a, the equilibrium fee tL
1 must satisfy SWH;E(tH
1 ;t
H;E




We can hence conclude that SWH;E(t00
1;t
H;E
2 ) < SWH;E(tH
1 ;t
H;E
2 ) < SWH;NE(tL
1;t
H;NE




2 ). Therefore, the regulator facing a high-cost incumbent does not have
incentives to deviate either, and the uninformative PBE where the regulator selects tL
1 survives the
Intuitive Criterion.
For the functional forms in the paper, condition C4 for the high-cost incumbent (evaluated at
the equilibrium fee tL
1 and output qL(tL









￿+A ￿ b ￿. Similarly, condition
C6a for the regulator (evaluated at the equilibrium fee tL
1 and output qL(tL





2￿A . This condition on entry costs is compatible with DL













2A ￿ ￿. In addition, b ￿ > ￿ implying that
the cuto⁄ cH
inc < ￿ is more restrictive than cH
inc < b ￿ for all ￿ > 1=2. ￿
6.7 Proof of Proposition 3










1 + ￿ + ￿(cH
inc)2 ￿ 2cH


















￿ (1 ￿ cH
inc)2(2d ￿ 3)￿
8














D(1 + ￿) + D￿(cH
inc)2 + 2cH
inc(2(1 ￿ cL




where D ￿ ￿1 + 2d. The welfare bene￿t WBH
LowPriors is strictly positive for our set of parameter











2A ￿ ￿ and ￿ ￿ 1=2.






with that under complete information, WBL
CI, since both regulator and incumbent select the same












6.8 Proof of Proposition 4
High priors. Let us ￿rst examine the case in which priors are high, p > p. The di⁄erence be-






















3 ￿ 2d(3 + 10d)
￿
128A2
which, for compactness, we consider parameter values ￿ = 1, cH
inc = 1=2 and cL
inc = 1=4. This
expression WBL
HighPriors ￿WBL




, and remains positive for all









3￿+A and ￿ 2 [0;1].
When the incumbent￿ s costs are high, both regulator and incumbent select the same actions









CI . Therefore, WBH
HighPriors = WBH
CI.











holds, where H ￿
￿
(1 ￿ 4d)2(1 + (cL
inc ￿ 2)cL
inc) + 32BF





CI . The di⁄erence between the welfare bene￿t from introducing environmental regulation






















where G ￿ ￿7 + 2d + 32d2 + (9 ￿ 18d)cL
inc, R ￿ 4d(1 + 7d) + 4(1 ￿ 4d)2(cH
inc)2 and ￿ = 1. The
di⁄erence WBH
LowPriors ￿ WBH
CI is positive if and only if
cH
inc >






2(1 ￿ 4d)2 ￿ e ￿.
However, e ￿ > ￿ and hence, for the parameter values that sustain the uninformative equilibrium
(cH
inc < ￿), the di⁄erence WBH
LowPriors ￿ WBH
CI is negative. When the incumbent￿ s costs are low,
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